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A ROUND PEG-A SQUARE HOLE: THE CLOSE
CORPORATION AND THE LAW*
by
]. B. Wolens* *
D ELIMITING the close corporation is an exceedingly complex and
difficult task.! Typically, the "close corporation" is composed of rela-
tively few shareholders who are the active managers of the corporation.
Conversely, in the public corporation equity ownership and management
talent are almost completely separated. This basic difference explains in
large measure why a statute basically designed for the public corporation
is unsuited for the close corporation. Where business managers are the sole
suppliers of risk capital, the organization and structure of that business
are, and should be, distinct and different from that required where busi-
ness managers are entrusted with the funds of others. Statutory provisions
designed to protect outside investors and third party creditors from abuse
and misapplication of capital and corporate powers by business managers
are not equally applicable to insure fulfillment of the aspirations of the
business's owner-managers themselves.
I. CONCESSION oR RECOGNITION
In this country, the granting by the state of a certificate of incorpora-
tion was conceived as a "concession" to a group of natural persons to en-
gage in business as a legally viable entity, separate and distinct from the
individual members of the group. This legalistic act of conception required
appropriate and mandatory procedures. The act was ritualized and pre-
scribed for each jurisdiction in the form of a business corporation statute.!
Apparently, the close corporate problems which we are now experiencing
in such profusion stem from a "hang-up" on the ancient concessionistic
* This Article may be submitted to the School of Law, Southern Methodist University in par-
tial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws.
** B.A., Rice University; LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Graduate Fellow (S.J.D.),
Harvard University School of Law. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
' A complete listing of all articles of note on the needs of the close corporation is too extensive
a task, and an unnecessary one, for the purposes of this paper. An idea as to the extent of such a
list can be obtained from the following: Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation--The
Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Gno. L.J. 1145 (1966); Fuller, The Incorporated
Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1938); Herwitz, Allo-
cation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 1098 (1962); Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 487
(1948); Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism,
27 U. Ch. L. REV. 696 (1960); O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corpora-
tion, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 641 (1965); Robinson, "Shareholder Agreements" and the Statutory Norm,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 68 (1957); Seward, Special Problems of Closely Held Corporations, 12 PRAC.
LAW. 57 (Nov. 1966); Spoerri, One Incorporator, One Director, 19 Bus. LAW. 305 (1963); Sym-
posium, The Close Corporation, 52 N.W.U.L. REv. 345 (1957); Weiner, Legislative Recognition of
the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273 (1929); Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Cor-
poration Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943); Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Cor-
porations, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1498 (1948); and, of course, the two-volume treatise, F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958).
'N. LATTN, ON CORPORATIONS 148-56 (1939); Kessler, supra note 1, at 702.
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theory. Unless we are willing to change the conceptual base upon which
the laws of the close corporation are formulated, we will continue to have
problems with court refusal to recognize the validity of owner-manage-
ment arrangements because of some supposed violation of the statutory
norm established in the authorizing concession legislation. A completely
satisfactory close corporate plan can be created only by legislation which
recognizes the freedom of the individual participants to conduct their bus-
iness, inter se, as they may determine, yet in a form which affords them
all limited personal liability.
We are not without precedent for such a system. In England, while ini-
tial corporate development was based on a concession theory, business par-
ticipants soon began to arrogate unto themselves the authority and power
to create this new type of entity. Ultimately, validation of their acts was
achieved in legislation, which under prescribed conditions, recognized
such participant-created entities as legally viable. Under this concept of
state "recognition," the participants were completely free to delineate the
terms of their agreement within broad limits drawn by the state to pro-
tect third parties.
The participants in a close corporation require arrangements which will
effectuate their agreement as to the conduct and management of the busi-
ness and the sharing of profits and losses resulting therefrom. No such
agreement should be allowed to tread upon provisions designed for the
protection of business creditors and other third parties dealing with the
business. However, there is no justification for imposing the rigors and for-
malities of concessionistic corporate statutes upon the close corporation, no
matter how desirable and necessary such provisions may be for the pub-
licly held business. 'What is required is a partnership-structured statute
that provides full entity status and hence limited participant liability.
A simple example of the concession theory at work is in order. One
provision basic to the bulk of modern corporate statutes is that -[t]he
business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of di-
rectors." Thus, any agreement between the shareholders qua shareholders
which tends to predetermine the vote of such shareholders when acting as
directors has been construed by the courts to be contrary to the pre-
requisite of independent business management by the directors qua di-
rectors.4 No matter how laudatory such provision may be for the publicly
held corporation, it is a preposterous imposition on the rational manage-
ment of a close corporation. To require business men formalistically to
wear different hats to accomplish what is, in reality, a unitary act-a busi-
ness decision-foments disrespect for the law itself among the very class of
society upon whom we must depend for the law's preservation.
In response to the needs of the business community, the ingenuity of
counsel was called upon to devise techniques to circumvent the restrictive
position taken by the courts. The techniques and devices so developed in-
clude: (1) classification of shares to provide for the election of a given
E.g., TEx. Bus. Coap. ACT art. 2.31A (1955).
4 See Kessler, supra note 1, and cases cited therein.
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percentage of directors by the shares of each class,' (2) cumulative voting
to insure representation in company management,e (3) the use of irrevo-
cable proxies to implement the provision of shareholder agreements,' (4)
" Such a classification is generally permitted under most concession type corporate statutes. E.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1100 (West 1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. )2, § 157.14 (1933); TEx. Bus.
CoRp. ACT art. 2.2-.13 (1955). Note, however, that courts have construed such classifications as
an invalid indirect attempt to do what could not be done directly. E.g., Renn v. U.S. Cement Co.,
36 Ind. App. 149, 73 N.E. 269 (1905); and see Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of
the Close Corporations, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 723-24 (1918). Classification of shares only assures
initial representation on the board of directors and without other protective provisions either in a
shareholder agreement or through a modern statute which prevents director removal except by the
majority vote of each class of shares which such director represents, the effectiveness of classification
is sorely limited. Without such protection, directors elected by class generally can be removed by
a majority vote of all shareholders.
Tax problems also may be created for a corporation by such a classification of shares. To be
eligible to elect the status of a "small business corporation," which permits the corporation to be
taxed essentially as a partnership, the corporation may have only "one class of stock." INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, S 1371 (a) (4). However, if the only distinction between the classes of the stock
is the right to elect directors proportionate to the number of shares in each group, a disqualification
for such election will not result. Treas. Regs. S 1.1137-1(g) (1959). However, a literal reading of
the regulation would require that the shares representing each class of such stock be in proportion to
the total number of shares issued. One of the reasons for the issuance of class stock could be to
provide a greater voice in the management to a minority shareholder whose management experience
is such so as to entitle him to a larger share of management prerogative.
Nevertheless, we may conclude that to date, classification of shares is the best method so far
developed to assure at least initial representation of all interests on the board of directors. Accord,
Israels, supra note 1, at 495; Seward, supra note 1, at 59-60.
* Depending upon the number of shares held by a particular shareholder and the number of
directors to be elected, cumulative voting may provide an effective means for maintaining con-
tinuous representation of minority interests on the close corporate board of directors. An analysis
of corporate statutes for all of the fifty states indicates that cumulative voting is either mandatory
or permissive in each state except Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Georgia. The new Georgia corpora-
tion law, GA. CODE ANN. §5 22-801 to 22-808 (1968) may correct this deficiency insofar as the
Georgia statute is concerned. Cumulative voting provisions range from the granting of an invariable
right embodied in a state constitution, e.g., ARrz. CoNsr. art. 14, 5 10, ILL. CoNsr. art. XI, 5 3,
Miss. CONsT. art. VIII, S 194, PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 4, to invariable authorization of such pro-
cedure in the basic corporate statute, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE S 2235 (West 1951), KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. S 17.3303 (1963), MICH. STAT. ANN. S 450.32 (1967), to that large group of cor-
porate statutes where cumulative voting provisions are wholly permissive, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, S 214 (Supp. 1967), N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW ch. 4, S 618 (McKinney 1963), TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT art. 2.29D (1955).
Even though directors may be elected cumulatively, they. may nevertheless be removed by
simple majority vote of the shareholders under most corporate statutes. E.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
art. 2.33 (1955).
Statutory protection of the cumulative voting device has been provided in many states. Although
statutory protection of directors elected under cumulative voting procedures have not been enacted
by even a majority of the jurisdictions, some states have afforded this protection. E.g., ARK. Bus.
CORP. ACT S 64-304A (1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 706(c)(1) (McKinney 1963). In gen-
eral, see the discussions contained in Folk, Corporate Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuKE L.J. 875,
919; Rudolph, Further Thoughts on the One- and Two-Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAW. 781, 782
(1965); Seward, supra note 1, at 59-60.
" Early corporate law development in the United States struck quickly and devastatingly at the
attempted use of even a simple annual proxy. The early courts viewed the proxy as a denial to
the individual shareholder of the advice and judgment of his fellow shareholders which was a part
of the contract he made at the time of the purchase of his shares. Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige
590 (Ch. N.Y. 1829); Commonwealth ex tel. Verree v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134 (1883). Proxies
were also attacked on a basis of separating the voting rights from the ownership of the shares.
Cone's Ex'rs v. Russell, 48 N.J. Eq. 208, 21 A. 847 (Ch. 1891); 'William Randall & Sons, Inc. v.
Lucke, 123 Misc. 5, 205 N.Y.S. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
The irrevocable proxy was met headlong by an intransigent court. Express irrevocable proxies
nevertheless have been held to be: revocable because being a simple agency arrangement they must,
like agency, be subject to revocation (e.g., State ex rel. Breger v. Rusche, 219 Ind. 559, 39 N.E.2d
433 (1942)); void as a device to prevent the purchaser of the shares from exercising the full right
of ownership (Sullivan v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221, 74 N.Y.S. 787 (1902)); void as an attempt
to establish a voting trust without following the mandatory statutory procedures (Abercrombie
v. Davis, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (Ch.), modified, 36 Del. Ch. 102, 125 A.2d s88 (Ch.
1956) ); void as a violation of the statute of limitations on the duration of the proxy and therefore
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establishment of voting trusts to effect the terms of shareholders' agree-
ments, s (5) preemptive rights to prevent dilution of a shareholder's inter-
est in the company,' (6) jointly held shares to control and insure manage-
ment positions,"0 and (7) higher than statutory quorum and/or voting re-
quirements for shareholders' and/or directors' meetings in regard to spe-
cific or general matters. 1 These techniques have been employed because of
contrary to public policy (People v. Burke, 72 Colo. 486, 212 P. 837 (1923)); void as a device
to purchase votes contrary to public policy (Macht v. Merchants' Mortgage Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74,
194 A. 19 (1937); Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937); McQuade v. Stone-
ham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934)); or, void as a violation of the directors' discretion
where such irrevocable proxy machinery is used to install certain persons as officers or employees
(Morel v. Hodge, 133 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Odman v. Oelson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d
439 (1946)). In general, see the discussions in H. BALLANTINE, ON CoRPOATIoNS S 179 (rev.
ed. 1946); F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 227-29, 316-42, 365; Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH.
L. REV. 38 (1942); Bradley, supra note 1, at 1149, 1164-67; Note, The Irrevocable Proxy and
Voting Control of Small Business Corporations, 98 U. PA. L. Rrs. 401 (1950).
s The voting trust was, of course, an outgrowth of the court's intransigent attitude toward the
irrevocable proxy. There was no separation of ownership and voting rights where the proxy holder
was in fact the legal holder of such shares. Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regula-
tions, 21 TExAs L. REV. 139, 146-47 (1942). The voting trust has now received express statutory
authorization in almost every state. The terms upon which voting trusts are authorized vary with
the jurisdiction. For example, the permissible term of such trusts varies from a maximum period
of five years, as in New Mexico, to the Missouri provision which authorized voting trusts to be
created for an unlimited time expressly waiving the' rule against perpetuities in such instances.
Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 351, § 351.246 (1959).
s Preemptive rights may be asserted in the form of a suit: for damages to prevent dilution of
voting power and corporate assets (e.g., Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E.
1009 (1906)); to enjoin the issuance of a new security (e.g., Hammond v. Edison Illuminating Co.,
131 Mich. 79, 90 N.W. 1040 (1902)).
Although the basic principles of preemptive rights of shareholders are still recognized where
applicable (eg., Klopot v. Northrup, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A.2d 700 (1944); Steven v. Hale-Haas
Corp., 249 Wisc. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946)), freeze-out and squeeze-out techniques are available
to evade any existing preemptive rights. Such techniques include share issuance when minority
interests are known to be financially "embarrassed" (Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.
1953); Hyman v. Velsicof Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1961)), or the issuance
of stock for property or services.
0 The possibility of issuing the stock of the corporation jointly in the name of all participants
and then letting their agreement inter se determine how the votes so represented are to be cast,
has not yet been fully developed. A now repealed Connecticut statute required unanimous action
for a single jointly held share, yet if more than one share was jointly held, a majority of the joint
owners could control the votes so represented. Levine v. Randolph Corp., 150 Conn. 232, 188 A.2d
59 (1963); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. S 33-311(d) (Supp. 1959). This anomalous result has been
changed by recent amendment. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-311(a) (1961).
" Interestingly enough five states, namely Alabama, Arizona, Nevada, Rhode Island; and Ten-
nessee have no statutory provision regarding quorum requirements for shareholders' meetings, while
twelve states, i.e., Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, Washington, and West Virginia have no specific required percentage of
votes for general shareholder action. The balance of the states have a general specification of a
majority of the outstanding shares as the basic quorum requirement although some authorize the
articles of incorporation or bylaws to vary such requirement, but not less than one-third of the
outstanding shares. E.g., TEx. Bus. Coip. ACT art. 2.28A (1955).
Despite the dearth of authorization for greater than majority quorum requirements as regards
shareholders' meetings, a majority of the states expressly permit greater than majority or statutory
votes for general or specific shareholder action. E.g., Tux. Bus. Cop. ACT art. 2.28A (1955).
In regard to directors' meetings, apparently only two states, New Jersey and New Mexico, have
no provision as to requisite quorum requirements, while four states set mandatory majority quorum
standards, i.e., Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, and Pennsylvania.
Four states, New Jersey, New Mexico, Vermont, and West Virginia set no requirements in re-
spect to the vote required to carry director resolutions, while nine states apparently establish an
unvariable majority vote for resolution passage, i.e., Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Greater than majority voting requirements are
authorized by a majority of the states, while a nevertheless substantial minority expressly authorize
greater than majority quorum requirements. E.g., TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACT art. 2.35A (1955).
High quorum or voting requirements have been invalidated on the grounds that: the statute
prescribes a mandatory rather than permissive standard (e.g., Clausen v. Leary, 113 N.J. Eq. 324,
166 A. 623 (Ch. 1933)); such requirements are inconsistent with basic corporate mechanics (e.g.,
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the uncertainty and the basic intransigence of the courts in construing
shareholder agreements by which owner-managers have attempted to ar-
range contractually the management and affairs of their business."
A critical examination of the effectiveness of such protective and con-
trol devices in the climate created by concessitnistic corporate statutes
clearly demonstrates that such devices are inadequate to accomplish con-
tractual management arrangements among owner-participants in a close
corporation. In general, such techniques are capable only of insuring va-
rious segments of the owner-participants an initial place on the board of
directors and, hence, a temporary voice in the management. These devices
are ineffective when statutory or contractual protection from removal of
the directors so elected is not provided.
II. THE PRESENT TRENDS
An analysis of modern cases indicates that courts are becoming more
cognizant of the close corporation as a business form and more lenient in
respecting the contractual desires of its shareholder-managers through a
recognition of the validity and enforceability of shareholder agreements.
Legislatures also are being made increasingly aware of the problems of the
close corporation.'
While an examination of the corporation laws of the fifty states will
disclose that most state legislatures have not been disposed to permit close
corporate shareholders to invest their corporations with partnership-like
contractual attributes, a growing mood of liberality is evidenced by recent
amendments to several state corporate statutes. Some of these enactments
expressly recognize the "partnership" character of the close corporation
and prohibit shareholder arrangements from being invalidated on that
ground."' : I'r
Two basic approaches have been taken by state legislatures in the at-
Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910)); and such requirements
give rise to deadlock and corporate paralysis and hence are contrary to public policy (e.g., Benintendi
v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945)).
It must be recognized that even where expressly authorized, higher than normal quorum and/or
voting requirements are essentially negative protection devices. They afford no affirmative remedy,
but do allow a minority shareholder to block action which might be disadvantageous to his inter-
ests. However, it also permits an overly cautious or conservative shareholder to impede corporate
progress and stagnate or even destroy the corporate business.
In general, see O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power To Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special
Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAw & CONTEmp. PRoE. 451 (1953).
" E.g., the New York experience as evidenced by Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1967); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); McQuade v.
Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559
(1918).
a Nine states now expressly or impliedly recognize the validity of shareholder agreements. CAL.
Cosu. CoDE ch. 1038, § 305 (West 1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350-354 (Supp. 1967);
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 608.0105 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. S§ 22-611 (1968); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, S 104 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-73 (1955); N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW S
620 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 7-1-3, 7-4-5 (1956); S.C. Bus. Corp. Act of
1962, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.22 (Supp. 1962).
" E.g., "No written agreement among stockholders of a close corporation . . . shall be invalid
on the ground that it is an attempt . . . to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange relations . . . in a manner that would be appropriate only among partners." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1967).
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tempted accommodation of the close corporation. Some states have en-
deavored to provide for the more basic requirements of the close corpora-
tion within the framework of a general business corporation law, applicable
to both public and closely held corporations. Such a combined statute pro-
ceeds on the assumption that provisions designed to relieve the close cor-
poration from the formalism desirable only for the public corporation will
be unworkable or untenable in the context of the publicly held company."'
The other basic alternative is a special statute for the close corporation. To
date, such a sharp break with time-encrusted concessionistic philosophy has
been achieved by only three states," and their achievement has been some-
what dulled by their inability to shift completely to a freely contractual
and recognition-based statute.
Despite the fact that relatively few states have enacted special close cor-
poration provisions, amelioration of concessionistic philosophy can be found
in many corporate statutes. This legislative awareness of the close corpora-
tion has been manifested in a reduction of the formalism required as a pre-
requisite to close corporate existence. For example, it is not unusual now to
find state corporate statutes which authorize such informalities as a single
incorporator," less than three directors," - higher than statutory quorum
and/or voting requirements for shareholder and/or director action,1 and
informal directors' and/or shareholders' meetings." A smattering of other
"sThis philosophy is evidenced by the New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia
legislation.
eDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5S 341-365 (1953); FLA. STAT. SS 608.0100-.0107 (1963); MD.
CoDE ANN. art. 23, SS 100-11 (Supp. 1.67). But note that the Delaware provisions for close cor-
porations are incorporated into the basic business corporation act which applies to publicly and
closely held companies except insofar as made inapplicable by special provisions.
"E.g., ARK. Bus. CORP: AcT 5 64-501 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. S 25-213 (Burns Supp.
1968); IOWA CODE § 496A.48 (1959); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 450.3 (1948); MINN. STAT. S
301.03 (Supp. 1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 311.050 (1959); ORE. Bus. COa'. ACT 5 57.306 (1953);
Wis. Bus. CORP. ACT S 180.44 (1951); Wyo. Bus. CORP. ACT § 17-36.45 (1961).
"E.g., ARK. Bus. CORP. ACT S 64-302 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.46 (Smith-Hurd
1954); IOWA CODE 5 496A.31 (1962); Ky. REv. STAT. 5 271.345 (1962); MINN. STAT. 5
301.28(1) (1967); Mo. STAT. ANN. S 351-315(1) (1959); NEB. Bus. COP. ACT 5 21-111
(1962); ORE. Bus. CORP. ACT 5 57.185 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 31, art. 1, 5 16(b)
(1968); Wyo. Bus. CORPs. ACT 5 17-36.34 (1957). Under the Wyoming statute, 222 of the 1,120
corporations formed between July 1, 1961, and July 1, 1964, provided for a one- or two-man
board of directors; while from Jan. 1, 1962, to July 1, 1964, 61 of the corporations formed pro-
vided for one director, while 134 provided for two directors. See Rudolph, supra note 6, at 786.
"All states have some provision for higher quorum and/or voting requirements at shareholders'
and/or directors' meetings except Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 30.139 (1967)). Louisiana (LA.
REV. STAT. S 12.34 (1950)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 14:10-9 (1937)), New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. S 51-6-3 (1953)), and Michigan (MIcH. COmp. LAWS §§ 450.38, 450.13 (4) (c)
(West 1967); but ree id. S 450.32). Although in some instances, such provision takes the rather
unsatisfactory form of simply permitting the articles or bylaws to vary the otherwise majority
rule set by the statute (E.g., MINN. STAT. S 301.25(7) (1945)), a few statutes expressly author-
ize greater quorum requirements for shareholder and director meetings (e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 616, 707, 709 (McKinney 1963); S.C. Bus. CORP. ACT S§ 12-16.8, 12-18.10 (Supp. 1967)),
while an even greater number authorize greater than a majority vote at shareholder or director
meetings for specified actions but never less than the percentage established at law. (E.g., ALASKA
STAT. S 10.05.153, 10.05.801 (1962); COLO. CORP. ACT §5 31-4-15, 31-5-6 (1958); D.C. Bus.
CoRP. ACT 5 29-916d (1954); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, 5S 157.37, 157.146 (1933); Miss. Bus.
CoRP. AcT 5§ 5309-58, -76 (1962); Tex. Bus. CRP. ACT arts. 2.28(A), 2.35(a) (1955)).
"
5 All states now expressly authorize: action by directors and/or shareholders without a meeting
subject to unanimous written director or shareholder consent except Arizona, Kansas, Maine, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Tennessee, Vermont; stock transfer restrictions (e.g., TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.22 (1955, as amended Supp. 1967)); or director authority to fix their own
compensation as either directors or officers (e.g., Wis. Bus. CORP. ACT § 180.31 (2) (1953)).
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provisions which minimize the possibility of minority shareholder oppres-
sion have been enacted. Among the various state corporations statutes are
provisions which require payment of dividends in specified situations,"
permit shareholders to establish conditions precedent to judicial dissolu-
tion," provide for dissolution on director and shareholder deadlock,' and
permit the court to appoint a provisional director in order to break the
deadlock of the directors and shareholders." The broader and more exten-
sive amendments to basic corporate statutes have at minimum clarified
and to some extent simplified corporate administration for the closely held
corporation.'
III. THE UNIFIED STATUTES
North Carolina. North Carolina was the first state to enact a basic cor-
porate revision which included specific accommodations for the close cor-
poration. ' While this accommodation of the close corporation ameliorates
some formalities inherent in the corporate structure, many of the con-
straints of the old regimen remain unshaken. For instance, to overrule dicta
of the North Carolina Supreme Court," the statute declares that the ex-
istence of a corporation is not impaired by the acquisition of all the shares
by one person," nor is limited liability lost."a Informal shareholder action,'
as well as informal director action," is authorized upon the written con-
sent of all persons entitled to participate in the meeting.
In spite of these advances, the North Carolina revision retains such an-
achronisms as the requirement of three incorporators,' a required organ-
izational meeting of the initial board of directors," and a minimum of
three directors." The latter requirement is even more unfortunate because
of the far reaching provisions of the revision authorizing shareholders'
vote pooling agreements , and other written shareholders' agreements re-
lating to the affairs and management of the corporation even though such
agreements limit the discretion of the board of directors. ' The effect of
such retained formalism is made even more unclear by the express provi-
sion that, "no written agreement.., shall be invalid as between the parties
thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat
"'E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 51-3-16 (1953).
" E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 55-125(3) (1955).
" E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.86-91 (1945).
"E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (West 1955).
" In general, see Folk, supra note 6, at 946, 957-58; O'Neal, supra note 1.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 55 (1955).
"7 "Query: Since McLean has acquired all the stock of the plaintiff, is it now a corporation?"
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 478, 85 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1955). On re-
hearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956), the court expanded the quoted dicta into a fullblown
rationalization against the existence of a one-man corporation.
2"N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 55-3.1 (a) (1957).
" Id. 5 55-53(e).
soId. 5 55-63(c).








the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their'relationship
in a manner that would be appropriate only between partners."'" What is
the status of a shareholders' agreement which purports to follow such au-
thorization and gives the shareholders full management rights? Do the re-
quired three directors become do-nothing figureheads? Is an agreement in-
valid because it goes beyond control of director discretion and eliminates
the board of directors as such? North Carolina declares the contractual
freedom of the participants in a close corporation, yet apparently requires
the useless appendage of a three-man board of directors without functions
or duties.'
The North Carolina revisions omit any specific provisions to validate
or regulate transfer restrictions." Although it has been said that this omis-
sion was intentional because of the liberality of North Carolina courts in
allowing such restrictions for any good business reason,' regulation of the
right to restrict transferability should have been incorporated into the
statute to prevent the "lock-in" of minority shareholders and to provide
some system of notice to third parties.
The new provisions authorizing shareholder agreements have been en-
forced in one case by the North Carolina Supreme Court." A shareholder's
agreement requiring the election of one shareholder as president of the
company for a period of five years was held valid on the basis of the re-
vision of the corporate law, and the court awarded damages for breach of
the agreement.' Although the president refused resignation and was ousted
from office by shareholder vote, it is unclear whether he requested reinstate-
ment in fulfillment of the shareholders' agreement or, if he had so re-
quested, whether the shareholders' agreement would have been enforced
by mandatory injunction. Such' enforcement would be apparently war-
ranted by the language of the statute," yet might create substantial busi-
ness problems. Arguably, the case may restrict the use of future share-
holders' agreements, because the court apparently confined the use of such
agreements to situations where the interests of other shareholders are not
prejudiced and where a substantial benefit is not conferred on one of the
parties. However, bestowing substantial benefits on a shareholder or group
of shareholders may have been the purpose of the agreement. Further-
more, the determination of "prejudice" is a highly subjective matter, and it
is questionable whether a post hoc determination by the court of "preju-
dice" should be allowed to neutralize the bargained positions of the par-
ticipants in a close corporation.
"id. S 55-73(b).
331d. S $f-24(a) requires that the business of the corporation be managed by the board of
directors subject to the provisions of the charter, bylaws, or agreement between shareholders.
"Except for a brief reference to the effect of a transfer of shares subject to a shareholders'
agreement. Id. S 55-73(b).
"E.g., Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 305, 108 S.E. 744 (1921). See also Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New Nortb Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432,
450 (1956). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(c) (1965) permits the bylaws to include any provisions for
restricting transfer of shares.
"Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
"Id. And see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (1965).
1Id. But note that the court is given not only the right to determine voting rights but also
such other relief as may be just and proper. Id. S 55-71.
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The North Carolina revision permits superstatutory quorum require-
ments for directors'" and shareholders' meetings," and also greater than
statutory voting requirements for both directors'" and shareholders' meet-
ings.' But the validity of charter or bylaw provisions requiring unani-
mous quorum or voting requirements is still ii question. The revision
leaves this area to negative implication rather than specifying the validity
of such arrangements. Likewise, the greater than statutory requirements
are not protected by provisions which prevent the removal of such re-
quirements from charter or bylaws by a vote of less than the superstatu-
tory percentage." North Carolina also retains features authorizing cumula-
tive voting" and voting trust agreements effective for periods not to ex-
ceed ten years."
The status of irrevocable proxies in North Carolina may be somewhat
questionable because the revision purports to make all proxies, whether or
not coupled with an interest or otherwise irrevocable by law, valid for a
period of no more than ten years." This seems to indicate that irrevocable
proxies may not exist in North Carolina unless they would otherwise be
irrevocable by law. This conclusion appears to be reinforced by the lan-
guage of the revision."" It is doubtful that the revisors of the corporate
statutes intended to revive the problems inherent in the use of irrevocable
proxies. Yet, such may be the result when a conservative court is faced
with this problem.
Because superstatutory quorum and/or voting requirements create
greater possibilities of corporate deadlock, scrupulous attention should be
given deadlock provisions. The only remedy offered by the North Carolina
revision is dissolution, which may be decreed in an action by a shareholder
where deadlock exists, where the business cannot be conducted advan-
tageously to all shareholders, or where events entitling a shareholder to dis-
solution as provided in the charter or other written agreement have oc-
curred." Dissolution may be too drastic a remedy, and in a given fact sit-
uation dissolution may well work to the disadvantage of a majority of the
shareholders. To grant a minority interest this form of statutory black-
mail goes too far. Ameloriation of the provision to give the court broad
equity powers has been suggested and should be incorporated in the sta-
tute."
Although most of the changes intended to accommodate the close cor-
poration are nevertheless available to any corporation incorporated in
"Id. 5 $$-28(d).
"Id. 5 55-65(a).
"Id. 5 55-28(d).47 id. S 55-65(a).
"For example, see the provision in Connecticut: CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. S 33-329(c) (1961).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 15-67(c) (1965).
"Id. S 55-72.
51 1d. § 55-68(b).
'5 Id. S 15-68 (c) provides that the proxy is suspended by the appearance at the meeting of the
person executing the proxy, "*except in the case of valid proxy which is by law irrevocable and
which states on its face that it is irrevocable . (Emphasis added.)
3id. 5 55-125(a).
"Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporate Law: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and
the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 867-71 (1965).
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North Carolina, the shareholders' agreement relating to management of
the corporation in a partnership manner is restricted to corporations whose
shares are not at the time or subsequently "generally traded in the markets
maintained by securities dealers or brokers." The problems with this at-
tempted definition are basic ambiguity of terminology and failure to cap-
ture the essential characteristic of the close corporation, namely the par-
ticipation in management by the business owners."' Nevertheless, the North
Carolina statute was novel for its time and provided the basic framework
for the subsequent changes in New York and South Carolina.
New York. The New York Business Corporation Law of 1961 represents
the culmination of five years of extensive law revision effort, and the ex-
penditure of more than one third of a million dollars."7 It is interesting that
in such a complete revision New York chose a unified corporate statute
basically applicable to public and close corporations alike. " This decision
was apparently made because of the New York Law Revision Commission's
articulated inability to arrive at a precise definition of the close corpora-
tion which would clearly separate it from the publicly held enterprise."
Yet the Revision Commission was required to define the close corporation
for the purposes of voting agreements, and for this purpose in effect defined
the closely held corporation as one whose shares are not "listed on a national
securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market
by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association."'
The problem of defining the close corporation cannot be minimized, but
the attempt to equate close corporateness with lack of share trading catches
only a single result of close corporateness and none of its essence. Lack of
share trading may be a manifestation of the personal involvement of the
close corporate shareholders in their business; but it may also result from
factors arising in the life of a corporation with independent management.
Moreover, this definition suffers from the same vagueness and uncertainties
as the North Carolina provision." What is "an over-the-counter market?"
When is stock "regularly quoted?" The Revision Commission saw fit to
leave these questions open, presumably for ad hoc court determination.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-73(b) (1965).
"For a general discussion of the North Carolina revision, see Bradley, Toward a More Perfect
Close Corporation--The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L. REv. 1145, 1150,
1179-84 (1966); Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Ana-
chronism, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 696, 725-28 (1960); Laty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432 (1956); Note, Dissolution of the
Close Corporation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 239, 246-48 (1966).
5'Henn, The Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BUFFALO L.
RExv. 439 (1962).
"For detailed discussion of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961 in general, see
Folk, supra note 6; Henn, supra note Y7; Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in
New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 BRooELTy L. REV. 1 (1961); Hornstein,
Analysis of the Business Corporation Law, 6 McKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK,
ANNOTATED, app. 1, at 441 (West 1963); Israels, supra note 1; Stevens, Close Corporations and
the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11 BuF't.o L. REv. 481 (1962). And see 6
McKrNNET'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW Yoss, ANNOTATED 39 (Supp. 1967).
"Hoffman, supra note 18, at 2.
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 620(c) (McKinney 1963).
" See text accompanying note 56 sura.
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This is not the clarity or certainty which the practicing attorney desires
or deserves. When the attorney has labored to establish a viable business
entity, he is entitled to the security of knowing that his brain-child will
survive.
New York's new formal requirements for organization of the close cor-
poration conform more realistically with corporate practice. For example,
the New York law requires only one incorporator; yet surprisingly enough
this incorporator must be a "natural" person."2 Organizational meetings are
no longer required, and instead, a written instrument signed by the incor-
porators may be filed in lieu of the organizational meeting.'
The statute also provides for shareholder action without a meeting upon
the unanimous consent of all shareholders and with the further provision
that the certificate of incorporation may provide for such informal action
upon the concurrence of less than unanimous consent, but still presumably
more than a majority." Regrettably, no similar provision is made for in-
formal meetings of the board of directors. This may have resulted from
the Revision Commission's belief that close corporate shareholders would
utilize the provision of the new Act authorizing them to exercise the man-
agement discretion of the board of directors."
Although the shareholders may transfer all management authority of the
board of directors to one or more shareholders, there is no provision for
complete elimination of the board of directors, which apparently must
remain as a totally ineffective appendage." Because the Act is without pro-
visions for informal meetings of the board of directors, this powerless
group apparently must hold formal meetings to decide nothing. It is almost
inconceivable that a court would impose such useless formality in the
face of the permissiveness of the Act, yet a look at the decisions under
the new law convinces one that anything is possible."
Insofar as planning of the close corporation is concerned, the New York
Business Corporation Law retains and amplifies such basic features of the
model act as classification of shares," cumulative voting provisions,"' pro-
"N.Y. Bus. Cou". LAW § 401 (McKinney 1963).
63 Id. S 404(b).
"Id. 5 61;.
"Hoffman, supra note $8, at 9; N.Y. Bus. Coat. LAW S 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
" Id. § 620 (b) places no express limits on the extent to which the management powers of the
board of directors can be invaded by shareholder agreements incorporated within the certificate of
incorporation. However, id. S 701 places management of the company in the board of directors
except as limited by such. agreements. While this provision may be interpreted to authorize the
elimination of the board of directors, yet it would seem that id. § 702 would require that there be
a board of directors, albeit with no authority to manage. Such section requires that in no event
shall the number of directors be "less than the number of shareholders." Such provision could con-
ceivably be interpreted by a conservative court as requiring a board of directors even though shares
are held by only one person.
61A federal district court has held that greater than statutory voting requirements void when
made as against public policy were still void even in light of the new statute since the shareholders
had not expressly readopted such provisions after the effective date of the new act. It was not noted
by the court that the shareholders had not acted to repeal the provisions after the act purported to
make them effective. Globe Slicing Machine Co. v. Hasner, 223 F. Supp. $89 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
aff'd, 333 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 969 (1965) (affirmed without discussion
on this point).
68 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 5 501 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
•I Id. S 618 (McKinney 1963).
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visions for voting trust agreements," elaborate provisions relating to pre-
emptive rights,"1 and shareholder appraisal rights and procedure for en-
forcement."
The New York revision also expressly validates all forms of shareholder
voting agreements. In particular, shareholder voting agreements, pooling
agreements and voting trusts are expressly authorized. ' Unhappily, the
voting agreement provision relates only to "voting rights," and it is pos-
sible that this section will be interpreted to mean only those voting rights
which are now validly exercisable under the provisions of the statute or
by prior case law. 4 A shareholders' agreement to elect named persons as
directors was recently upheld even though the agreement specified no
termination date."'
Greater than majority requirements for quorum and voting of share-
holders and directors are expressly permitted"4 if such provisions are placed
in the certificate of incorporation. Because the Revision Commission did
not see fit expressly to authorize unanimous voting agreements, the status
of such provisions will remain unclear until a court decision resolves the
matter.
The narrow construction which may be placed on the permissively in-
tended Business Corporation Law is well illustrated by a New York ap-
pellate decision." The bylaws of the corporation purported to require a
two-thirds shareholder vote to amend the provision of the bylaws estab-
lishing the number of directors. The New York law provides that the
shareholders may change the number of directors by an amendment to the
bylaws embodying such change or by simple resolution if such procedure
is authorized in the bylaws.7 ' The Act further provides that a majority
vote of the shareholders is all that is required to amend the bylaws unless
the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise." In this case, the share-
holders attempted by resolution adopted on simple majority vote to in-
crease the number of directors from four to five. Although the majority of
the court correctly found that the superstatutory bylaws provision was
invalid, the shareholder action by simple resolution without a supporting
bylaw permitting such action was found to be equally invalid." In dissent,
Judge Fuld, with his usual perception, decried the literalness of the ma-
jority, pointing out that the shareholder action was sufficient under the
statute to amend the bylaws to provide for the increase in the number of
7 Id. 5 621.
7'1d. 5 622.
R"Id. § 623 (McKinney Supp. 1967)..
'BId. § 620(a), 621 (McKinney 1963).
T Hoffman, supra note 58, at 8.
" 721 Corp. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 40 Misc. 2d 395, 243 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
T. 1963). The, court sustained a motion to restrain a special shareholders' meeting of Tiffany &
Co., called to remove two directors elected pursuant to a shareholders' agreement. The court found
the agreements unlimited as to term, nevertheless within the authority granted under N.Y. Bus.
Coap. LAW S 620(a) (McKinney 1963).
"eN.Y. Bus. Coa,. LAW SS 616, 709 (McKinney 1963).
"Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 N.E.2d 553 (1965).
"N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW S 702(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
"Id. §§ 601, 614(b), 616(a)(2).
"
0 Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 N.E.2d 553 (1965).
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directors. Thus, the shareholder resolution should have been treated as the
requisite action which, in fact, it was intended to be." The hyper-technical
adherence to formalism insisted on by the majority serves to defeat the
efforts and labors of the Revision Commission.
An innovation of the New York Act is the provision which authorizes
ten per cent of the shareholders to file a suit for the removal of a director
for cause,8' thus overruling prior case law." Also, if provided in the certi-
ficate of incorporation, all officers or specified officers may be elected di-
rectly by the shareholders instead of the board of directors," and officers
so elected may be removed only by the shareholders." However, the officers
so elected may be "suspended" for cause by the board of directors." Minor-
ity interests are further protected by giving shareholders of ten per cent
of the outstanding shares the right to petition the court for removal for
cause of officers elected by the shareholders.
In the area of stock transfer, the new Act validates estate planning tech-
niques by expressly recognizing the right of the company to repurchase
its shares if at the time specified for performance it has legally available
surplus for such purpose."8 This effectively should end the conflict in case
law development.8 '
Although deadlock is an ever increasing possibility as minority share-
holder protective devices are expressly authorized and used in close cor-
porate formation, the New York revision provides only the harsh solution
of dissolution for such problems. As a positive note, however, creditor pro-
tection is provided by authorizing creditors to petition the court to re-
strain voluntary dissolutions by shareholders which would not be in the
best interest of the corporation or the creditors."
In four of the five statutory modes, the New York Act keys shareholder
petitions for dissolution in deadlock to inaction of the board of directors
or the shareholders in electing directors."' The remaining statutory mode
requires proof that the shareholders are so divided that dissolution is bene-
ficial to the shareholders as a group. ' If the shareholders by agreement"
can eliminate the board of directors, four of these statutory methods of dis-
solution evaporate. In addition, if a board of directors is required (regard-
less of whether it functions due to such shareholder agreements), a period
of at least one year must elapse before a minority shareholder can petition
81 Id.
"N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAw S 706(d) (McKinney 1963).
$"In re Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862 (1956).




I Id. 55 $13-14.
"I.e., City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N.Y. 507 (1958), which upheld the right of the
corporation to repurchase its shares as contrasted with the more recent line of cases following Top-
ken, Loring & Schwartz v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 731 (1928) which held unenforce-
able an agreement to repurchase shares upon termination of the employment of an employee.
"°N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 5 1008(a) (McKinney 1963).
"Id. §5 1104(a)(1), 1104(a)(2), 1104(b), 1104(c).
9Id. S 1104(a)(3).
Old. 5 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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for dissolution." Drastic economic consequences can occur within a stag-
nated business in less time. If a minority shareholder can block corporate
action through superstatutory voting requirements but must wait for one
year to petition for dissolution, neither he nor the majority shareholders
have been benefitted."
Although space and the scope of this paper preclude a more detailed an-
alysis of the New York provisions, it is submitted that the ambiguities and
conflicts created by even a well-drafted unified statute for close and public
corporations make this type of approach undesirable. The need for a
definition of the close corporation is not eliminated, and the attempt to
make provisions applicable to two dissimilar entities cannot be wholly
successful.
South Carolina. In 1962 South Carolina joined the bandwagon of states
including in a unified statute major provisions for the close corporation.
The principal goal of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act of
1962 was flexibility-to allow close corporate shareholders to act as freely
as if in partnership." This is purportedly recognized in the Act."
Though one-man corporations are judicially recognized in South Caro-
lina," the new South Carolina Act does not expressly provide for owner-
ship of all shares by one person. However, the Act does provide that one
"person" may act as an incorporator," and by the definition of "person,"' 15"
a partnership or corporation may act as the incorporator of a corpora-
tion.10
1
In regard to formality, the South Carolina Code still requires an organ-
izational meeting;1 ' yet informal meetings of shareholders1' and direc-
tors' are expressly authorized where there is unanimous written consent.
The Act does not authorize the elimination of the board of directors,1' and
"Id. S 1104(c) (McKinney 1963).
esId. S 1104 (a) (2) authorizes the holders of one-half of the shares to petition for dissolution
if the votes required for director election cannot be obtained. In a case such as posed in the text,
at least one-half of the shares should be able to agree on dissolution to prevent complete destruction
of their interests. However, as the practitioner well knows, it is difficult to predict what shareholder
action can be taken given the animosities developed in such contexts. § 1104(b) authorizes disso-
lution upon petition of holders of more than one-third of the shares, if superstatutory voting re-
quirements for election of directors, or director action are in effect. Again, such provision is in-
effective if there are no changes in director election requirements and management of the company
is transferred to the shareholders under id. S 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
In general, see references cited in Note, supra note $8.
"Meyers, The Close Corporation Under the New South Carolina Corporation Law, 16 S.C.L.
REV. 577 (1964).
e7S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.22(a) (1962) provides that "No agreement among shareholders
...shall be invalid because the agreement purports to treat the affairs of the corporation as if it
were a partnership and the shareholders as if they were partners."
"Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.C. 438, 49 S.E.2d 718 (1948).
"S.C. CODE ANN. S 12-14.2 (1962).
'Cold. 5 12-11.2(a).
'eFolk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporate Law Revision, 18 Bus. LAw. 351,
353 (1963), modified slightly and reprinted in I$ S.C.L. REV. 275 (1964).
1'"S.C. CODE ANN. S 12-14.7 (1962).
l1d. 5 12-16.18.
'041d. 5 12-18.12(b).
'0 Id. 5 12-18.1, 12-18.3.
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it is unclear to what extent shareholders may take over full management."'
However, shareholder management apparently was intended.' It has been
stated that a provision specifically authorizing shareholder management
was omitted in order to prevent confusion and the possibility of fore-
closing a line of development of the close corporation."8 It is difficult to
understand how the uncertainty created by the omission can do anything
but create confusion. South Carolina limits the validity of shareholder
agreements to ten years.'0 ' This provision allows shareholders to reevaluate
their positions but forces minority shareholders to renegotiate protective
devices built into the agreement. Under this system, an attorney is well
advised to build as much minority shareholder protection as possible into
the articles of incorporation where such protection apparently will not be
subject to renewal every decade. Seemingly, shareholder agreements among
less than all shareholders are not valid. This conclusion is derived by nega-
tive implication from the Act.11
South Carolina defines the close corporation in virtually identical lan-
guage and for the same purposes as New York."' This definition suffers
from the same uncertainties and ambiguities as that of New York and is
subject to the same criticisms."' Overruling prior case law," the South
Carolina Act expressly authorizes vote pooling agreements when in writing
and signed by all of the parties thereto."' Likewise, irrevocable proxies are
authorized to enforce pooling agreements." In contrast to shareholder
agreements, vote pooling agreements need not be consented to by all share-
holders;"" however, vote pooling agreements are, like shareholder agree-
ments, restricted to a term of ten years."" The imposition of a ten-year
limitation appears to conflict with South Carolina's wholehearted accep-
tance of the freedom and flexibility inherent in a statute authorizing part-
nership-like shareholder agreements." ' Requiring the shareholders in a close
corporation to review their basic formulation at a specified time interval
seems undesirable."' If the corporation is proceeding normally, with no
dissension among the shareholders, the provisions will be routinely renewed
as authorized by the Act." If, on the other hand, some disagreement has
106.e., compare id. S 12-16.22(2)-(b) witb N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 620(b) (McKinney Supp.
1967), which latter provision expressly authorizes transfer of all or part of the directors' manage-
ment powers to the shareholders.
107 S.C. CoDE ANN. S 12-16.22(e) (1962) imposes director liability on the shareholders to the
extent that the shareholders exercise director discretion.
"'eSee discussion in Folk, supra note 101, 18 Bus. LAW. 351, 363 (1963).
'" S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-16.22(b)(3) (1962).
"Old. § 12-16.22(b)(1)-(3) establishes conditions of validity for such agreements, one of
which is unanimous shareholder consent.
"'. Shareholders' agreements shall be valid only so long as shares "*are not traded on any national
security exchange or regularly traded in any over-the-counter market . Id. 5 12-16.22(c).
Such definition also applies to dissolution agreements. Id. S 12-22.14(b).
"' See text and footnote comments at notes 56 and 61 supra.
"' Cf. Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947).
"'S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.15 (1962).
I'sid. § 12-16.14(f) (5).
"OId. 5 12-16.15 provides for such agreements "between two or more shareholders."
'"Id. 5 12-16.15.
"'Bradley, supra note 56, at 1173.
" E.g., as in South Carolina every ten years. S.C. CooE ANN. 5 12-16.15 (1962).
120E.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 12-16.22(b) (1962).
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arisen, the minority shareholders, who may have bargained for and re-
ceived substantial concessions through the shareholder agreement, may be
relegated to a position which subjects them to all of the freeze-out and
squeeze-out techniques available under the old procedures.
While most of the other South Carolina close corporate provisions fol-
low the lead of North Carolina and New York,"' some are unique. For
example, the Act provides an apparently invariable majority rule as to
holders of jointly owned shares. m This may come as quite a blow to prac-
tioners who envisaged the jointly held share as a means of effective close
corporate planning.
South Carolina's provisions for dissolution upon deadlock are similar to
the New York provisions previously discussed;'" however, the South Car-
olina Act expressly authorizes discretionary court relief similar to that
granted under the English Private Company Act. '" Thus, in any share-
holder-filed dissolution action, the court within its discretion may take
action other than dissolution, such as: (1) cancelling or altering provisions
of the articles or bylaws; (2) altering a resolution or other act of the cor-
poration; (3) directing or prohibiting the act of the corporation, the
shareholders, directors, officers, or other parties to the action; or (4) pro-
viding for the purchase of the shares of any shareholder by either the cor-
poration or the other shareholders. m In addition, the Act lists seven spe-
cific conditions where a shareholder may petition the court for dissolution.
As these conditions are listed conjunctively and not made expressly dis-
junctive, the outcome of a shareholder's petition under only one of them
is uncertain.'
A more detailed analysis of the South Carolina close corporate provisions
is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper. It suffices to say that, with
its own idiosyncrasies, the South Carolina Act suffers from the contra-
dictions and ambiguities inherent in any attempt to devise a single frame-
work for such dissimilar entities as the public and close corporation. To
some extent the close corporate form in South Carolina may have been
disadvantaged by the Act because of the uncertainties which it injects into
their formation and operation."" However, the judicial alternatives to dis-
solution upon deadlock are a much needed innovation.
Georgia. On April 3, 1968, Georgia joined the list of states which have
enacted close corporate provisions within the framework of a general cor-
"21 Such as superstatutory quorum and voting requirements for shareholders' meetings (id. 5
12-16.8, 12-16.10), and for directors' meetings (id. § 12-18.10).
'Dld. S 12-16.13.
'"Compare id. %5 12-22.4, 12-22.15 udtb N.Y. Bus. Coap. LAW S 1104 (McKinney 1963).
'"S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (1962); English Company's Act, 1948, S 210, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38, 5 28.
"S.C. CODE ANN. 5 12-22.23(a)(1)-(4) (1962).
12 Id. 5 12-22.15(a). This may be an oversight on the part of the drafters of the Code; how-
ever, the section in effect reads that the court may award dissolution upon the petition of a share-
holder when he establishes that the seven conditions all exist. As the conditions are not made ex-
pressly disjunctive it is certainly open for a court to read the conditions conjunctively.
"'Accord, Bradley, supra note 16, at 1173.
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porate code revision."13 Although the Georgia Act eliminates many of the
useless formalities of the older model codes," it suffers the vice of all the
unified statutes. Specific close corporate provisions (such as express valid-
ity of shareholder agreements) apply only to those corporations whose
shares are "not generally" traded in an over-the-counter market. ' This
definition, like those previously discussed, does not capture the essence of
the close corporation, settling instead on only one outward manifestation of
close corporateness. Such a definition is not adequate, for the stock of a
company may be in the hands of many investors who for various reasons
do not trade it. These investors may need the protection of a general cor-
porate code, yet definitions based on share-trading could be used to au-
thorize and validate undue informalities in the operations of a small "pub-
lic" corporation.
The Georgia Act authorizes such basic close corporation control devices
as superstatutory quorum and voting requirements for directors' and share-
holders' meetings,"'1 shareholder pooling agreements,"' irrevocable proxiess
voting trusts,' and basic dissolution upon deadlock provisions.' The Act
also authorizes the appointment by the court of a provisional director in
case of director deadlock which the shareholders are unable to resolve.
Such appointment may be made on application of not less than one-half
of the directors or one-third of the shareholders. Once appointed, the pro-
visional director serves until removed by the court or by a majority of the
shareholders.' This provision appears to be quite similar to the California
statute."?
Unfortunately Georgia, like South Carolina, saw fit to limit the term
of shareholders' agreements.'" Georgia provides for reducing the number
of directors, but apparently prohibits the elimination of the board of di-
rectors,' even though management may be vested in the shareholders
pursuant to provisions placed in the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or
written shareholder agreement.'
Judging from the little information available to the author, it appears
that the new Georgia enactment fits into the basic pattern set by those
'"Bowman, An Introduction to the New Georgia Corporation Law, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 419 (1968).
A copy of the new enactment was not available to the author in time for this Article, so reliance
is placed on Mr. Bowman's reporting of the new Georgia statute.
3'2Such innovations are added as: only one incorporator is required (GA. CODE ANN. 5 22-801
(1968)); a corporation may be an incorporator (id.); no incorporation meeting is required (id. 5
22-802(a) (11)); shareholders and directors may act. without a meeting upon unanimous consent
(id. S5 22-603(d), 22-710); and if less than three shareholders, then a minimum number of re-
quired directors not less than the number of shareholders (id. S 22-702 (a)).
1 0Id. 5 22-611(b).




'34 Id. 5 22-612.
135 Id. 55 22-1317(a) (1), 22-1322.
'3' Id. 5 22-703 (1968).
137 CrAL. CORP. CODE 5 819 (West 1955).
"'Term may not exceed twenty years in Georgia. GA. CODE AN. 5 22-611(c) (1968). For
criticism of such provisions, see text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
'"Id. 5 22-702(d) requires an annual election of directors.
'4Id. 5 22-701(a); but note that such provisions are not effective as to third parties without
notice. d. S 22-701(b).
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states which have tried to work out a single statute to provide for forma-
tion and operation of both publicly and closely held corporations.
IV. THE CLOSE CORPORATION STATUTE
Florida. To date, Florida is the only state which has enacted a separate sta-
tute to accommodate the close corporation."1 The Florida Act, like the uni-
fied statutes, is permissive in that it applies only to those close corporations
which desire its specific application."' Unlike its counterparts, however, the
Act provides that close corporate status can be acquired upon the vote of
a simple majority of the shares.' How this election proceeds or how it is
terminated is left to counsel's ingenuity, for the statute is silent on these
matters. Apparently, there is no need to reject close corporate status if it
is not desired, but this conclusion can be reached only by negative infer-
ence from the election provisions. There is no provision for official docu-
mentation of the election, and this may invite post hoc determination when
such serves the convenience of the parties. Unfortunately, Florida used the
form of definition supplied by the North Carolina revision, tying close
corporateness to stock trading.'" Enough has previously been said about the
inadequacies of such a definition. But the Florida definition creates even
more uncertainties because it contains no provision in the event of loss of
close corporation status.
As in the North Carolina statute,"0 the Florida Act expressly declares
that no shareholders' agreement shall be invalid because it attempts to
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange shareholder
relations in a manner appropriate only between partners."' The Act vali-
dates the one-man corporation by expressly stating that the acquisition of
the stock by one or two persons violates no public policy of Florida." Be-
cause such validation is not limited to corporations electing close corporate
status, it is assumed that validation applies to all corporations in Florida.'"
Corporations with only one or two shareholders may possess all managerial
boards, bodies, and capacities which are held or authorized for corpora-
tions with three or more shareholders."'
For a close corporation, if there are not less than three stockholders, the
articles of incorporation may provide that the business be managed by
" Fla. Session Laws 1963, ch. 379, SS 1-8. For a comparison of North Carolina and New York
revisions with the Florida Act, see Bradley, supra note 56, at 1174-86; O'Neal, supra note 1, at
659-62; Rudolph, supra note 6, at 787-88; Note, supra note 56, at 246; Recent Statutes: Cor-
porations-In General-Florida Legislature Enacts Close Corporation Law-Florida Laws 1963, ch.
63-379, 77 HARv. L. Ruv. 1s 51 (1964). For a criticism of the Florida legislation, see Dickson, The
Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment That Failed, 21 U. MLA&i L. REv. 842 (1967).
14FLA. STAT. ANN. S 608.0100(1) (1963).
14 Id.
'"The close corporation is a corporation for profit whose shares of stock are not generally
traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers. Id. S 608.0100 (2). Compare with
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-73(b) (1955).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 55-73 (1955).
14"FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 608.0105(2) (1963).
147 1d. § 608.0101(2).
, The language of the section makes it applicable to a "corporation, hereafter or heretofore




the stockholders. In such a situation, the stockholders are deemed the di-
rectors for all purposes required under the basic corporation statute." The
mystic number of three again arises to plague corporate revision. What
logic can support a provision which permits twenty shareholders to man-
age their company directly, but requires that the sole shareholder manage
his close corporation through the medium of a formalistic board of direc-
tors? Such illogical provisions support the suggestion that the statute was
adopted without due and adequate consideration."S A curious provision of
the Act permits close corporate shareholders to retain the board of direc-
tors, yet strip them of all management and discretionary powers through
a shareholders' agreement."' Apparently, this provision could be used by
the one- or two-shareholder close corporation, which under the provisions
of the Act must retain a board of directors.
Informal meetings of the shareholders"3 and directors, where the business
of a close corporation is managed by a board of directors, " are author-
ized upon unanimous written consent of all persons entitled to participate
or vote at such meeting.
A novel provision in the Florida Act is the delineation of seven areas
to which a shareholders' agreement may relate. Although not limiting
shareholder agreements to these specific areas, the Florida Act calls atten-
tion to the usual areas covered by such agreements, namely management
of the business, declaration and payment of dividends or division of
profits, identity of officers and/or directors, restrictions on stock transfers,
voting requirements for shareholder and/or director action, employment
contracts, and arbitration of shareholder or director deadlock."
Removal of an uncooperative director is assured under the provision
which permits removal of a director with or without cause by the share-
holders entitled to elect such director.' Although this presumably was the
intent of the section, the language used makes it unclear whether a group
of shareholders entitled to elect a director may remove any director with or
without cause. Such a construction could be ruinous to the bargained posi-
tion of minority interests.
In the matter of deadlock, Florida again follows somewhat blindly the
lead of earlier close corporate provisions in specifying dissolution as the
only remedy for director and shareholder deadlock."" Although any one
shareholder may petition the court for dissolution, he must prove that (1)
the directors are deadlocked and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock, or the shareholders are deadlocked, and (2) arbitration or other
remedy provided in the shareholders' agreement has failed.' It is unfor-
tunate that the Florida Revision Committee did not take the additional
150d. S 608.0102.
S Dickson, supra note 141, at 842.
'"sFLA. STAT. ANN. 5 608.0101(3) (1963).
'd. 5 608.0103.
Id. 5 608.0104.
s"Id. 55 608.0105(1) (a)-(g).
' Id. S 608.0106.
1'Id. 5 608.0107.
'" Id. § 608.0107(1)-(3).
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step provided in South Carolina, Delaware, and Maryland, authorizing the
court to take action short of dissolution in appropriate circumstances. '
Florida's Close Corporation Act has been severely criticized as a self-
conflicting, haphazard borrowing from other state corporation statutes.'"
While even a cursory examination of the statute supports this conclusion,
the Florida revision must at least be praised for its recognition of the fact
that the close corporation is so different from the publicly held corporation
that a separate and distinct statute is required for its regulation.
V. THE COMPROMISE STATUTE
Delaware. The 1967 Delaware solution to the problems of the close cor-
poration represents a blending of the unified statute and separate statute
treatments. Instead of rewriting basic code provisions into a new statute
to accommodate the close corporation, the Delaware revision adds special
close corporation provisions in a separate subchapter of the general cor-
poration act. "1 ' The Delaware close corporate law applies only to corpora-
tions which meet a definitional test and elect to become a close corporation
in the manner prescribed in the law.'a A non-electing corporation is sub-
ject to all of the provisions of the basic corporation act, while the electing
close company is subject to only the provisions of the basic act which are
not otherwise changed by the special close corporate subchapter.'
Delaware is the first state to attempt a comprehensive definition of the
close corporation based upon multiple criteria. Delaware defines a close
corporation as one whose certificate of incorporation, in addition to the
basic requirements of the law, provides that: (1) all of the company's is-
sued stock of all classes shall be held of record by not more than thirty
persons; (2) all of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to at least
one restriction which either: (a) obligates the shareholder to give the cor-
poration, the other shareholders, or other specified person a first refusal be-
fore selling such stock; (b) obligates the corporation, the other share-
holders, or other specified party to purchase the securities of a shareholder
offered for sale; (c) requires shareholder or director consent to any pro-
posed transfer of the stock; or (d) reasonably prohibits the transfer of the
stock to designated persons or classes of persons; and (3) none of the
corporation's stock is offered in a manner which would constitute a "public
offering" within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933."'
Such a definition comes substantially closer to catching the essence of the
close corporation than a definition based upon the single criteria of the
trading of stock in a securities market. The close corporation is essentially
159DEL. GEN. CoFsP. LAW 6§ 352, 353 (1967); MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, S 109(c) (1967);
S.C. Bus. Co1P. ACT 5 12-23 (1962).
160Bradley, supra note 56, at 1186; Dickson, supra note 141, at 842.
'
6 1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 1, subch. XIV (1967), being SS 341-56 of the General Cor-
poration Law of the State of Delaware (1967).
"e DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1, S 341 (a) (1967).
'62ld. 5341(b).
'64id. 55 202(c)(1)-(4), 342(a)(1)-(3). For a definition of "public offering" see Securities




a business with few owners, substantially all of whom participate directly
in management. In practice, a close corporation is a sole proprietorship or
partnership with limited owner liability. Until legislatures and courts ac-
cept this simple fact of business life, statutes and decisions will continue
to fail to serve effectively the purposes for which they are intended.
Ostensibly, close corporate provisions are intended to do away with for-
malities and other investor protective devices built into general corpora-
tion acts which are not required when the investors themselves are directly
involved in the day-to-day management and affairs of the business. Al-
though the multiple criteria used in the Delaware Act better isolate the
close corporation than prior definitions based on stock trading, the Act
still fails to prevent abuse of the investor through management adoption
of close corporate informalities in the small "public company." A corpora-
tion with thirty or twenty or even ten investor/shareholders, none of
whom are involved in management, should be provided with the protec-
tion afforded by the general corporation statutes. However, the Delaware
limitation on the aggregate number of shareholders, coupled with restric-
tions on transferability of interests in the company, does partake of some
aspects of partnership arrangements.'
Obviously, the corporation is no longer a close corporation once it has
made a "public offering" of its stock. Although the term "public offering"
is a word of art as used in the securities acts, when a company's stock is
held in a manner which makes such a term applicable, the company in all
probability has moved into the realm of the management-shareholder/in-
vestor dichotomy which typifies the public corporation. Such a provision
is therefore useful in proscribing the outside limit of close corporateness.
To elect close corporation status under the new Delaware provisions, a
corporation amends its certificate of incorporation (by a two-thirds share-
holder vote) to include the statement that it elects to become a "close
corporation" and includes a similar statement in the heading and name
of the corporation.'" The election continues until terminated by (1) an
amendment to the company's certificate of incorporation passed by a two-
thirds vote of the shareholders or such greater voting requirement as may
be specified in the certificate of incorporation, deleting such provisions
from the certificate; or (2) a breach of one or more of the definitional
criteria, and neither the corporation nor any of the shareholders taking ac-
tion to correct the defect within thirty days after it is discovered.""' Un-
less the event causing termination is the voluntary act of the shareholders
in accordance with provisions of the certificate of incorporation or law,
the courts are given jurisdiction upon petition of the corporation or any
shareholder to issue orders necessary to prevent the termination of the close
corporate status.6 8
" E.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132(b), S 27(1) (1962) prevents the admission of
a transferee of a partner's interest into management without the consent of all then existing part-
ners.
16 DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1, SS 343(a), 344 (1967).
"




Constructive notice of stock restrictions to any purchaser is expressly
provided by the Delaware Act which requires the stock certificate to be
conspicuously marked with appropriate language. If so marked, any per-
son to whom such stock is transferred in violation of the qualifications or
restrictions is conclusively presumed to have notice of his ineligibility to be
a shareholder, and the corporation may refuse to transfer the stock into
the purchaser's name.'" Alternatively, the appropriate court upon the
petition of the corporation or any other shareholder presumably may re-
scind the transfer.'" Transfer restrictions and other limitations on share
ownership appear to be adequate to guarantee validity of any reasonable
restriction and insure recognition and enforcement of such provision
through appropriate court action." 1
The Delaware Act specifically provides for direct management of the
close corporation by the shareholders. In this event the shareholders are
deemed to be the directors of the company for the purposes of the appli-
cable provisions of the general corporation law. If the board of directors
is eliminated, a statement to this effect must be placed in the certificate of
incorporation and on the face of each stock certificate." '
If the shareholders do not eliminate the board of directors, a majority
of the shareholders of a close corporation may enter into a written agree-
ment among themselves restricting the discretion or powers of the board
of directors in regard to the conduct of any phase of the business of the
corporation. In so doing, the shareholders who are parties to the agreement
assume liability for managerial acts or omissions to the extent that cor-
porate management is controlled by the agreement."" The Delaware Act
expressly validates partnership-like arrangements contained in any such
shareholders' agreement."
The balance of the special close corporation subchapter of the Delaware
Act deals with the problems of close corporate disharmony. Like other
close corporation acts, the Delaware Act permits the shareholders to spe-
cify in the certificate of incorporation events which will automatically
dissolve the company or give rise to an option in any of the shareholders
to petition a court to dissolve the corporation. Any such provision must
be noted on each stock certificate.' In addition, any shareholder is given
the right in specified instances to petition the court for the appointment
of a custodian whose duties are to continue the corporate business, rather
than to liquidate the affairs of the corporation and distribute its assets. "
'
6 9 1d. S 347(d).
"1 d. S 348(b).
"'1 If a restriction is held invalid in any proceeding, the corporation is given the option for a
thirty-day period after such determination becomes final in which to purchase the stock which was
the subject of such court proceedings. If the parties cannot agree on a purchase price, the appraisal
proceedings established under the general corporation act are used. Id. §§ 349, 262.
17'Id. 351.
171Id. 5 350.
'74 Id. 5 354.
", 1d. §5 352(a) (2), 355. Compare uitb S.C. CODE ANN. S 12-22.15 (a) (6) (1962) and the
basic right of a partner to dissolution, e.g., TEx. Rxv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §5 31(1)(2),
32(1)(d) (1961).
5 6 Such right arises ifthe "affairs of the corporation are managed by the stockholders and they
are so divided that the business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable
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Upon such petition the court has the power to appoint a custodian or an
impartial provisional director if the latter will better serve the interests of
the corporation.'77 In addition, owners of one-third of all the stock or one-
half of the directors then in office may petition the court for the appoint-
ment of a provisional director.'""
Apparently, a shareholder has no right to petition for dissolution as such
except under circumstances prescribed in the certificate of incorporation
or when the corporation has abandoned its business and failed to dissolve.'""
Conceivably, the general corporate law provision for the appointment of a
custodian could be construed to authorize the court to order liquidation of
the corporation by the custodian. However, this action is not clearly au-
thorized, and in view of the courts' usual hesitancy to order dissolution, it
is uncertain whether dissolution is an available remedy for deadlock under
the Delaware Act."' If dissolution is not such a remedy, shareholders will
have to accept stagnation of the business or management by a third party."'
Regrettably, Delaware does not provide shareholders with the further
and more practical alternative of a forced buy or sell agreement under
court supervision."' Dissolution or third party management would then
become an alternative to effective and equitable shareholder control with-
out continuing court involvement. This remedy puts additional pressure
upon the various factions within the close corporation to reach an agree-
ment, and also provides an alternative in situations in which the court de-
termines that hostilities have reached the point that future reconciliation is
impossible.
Maryland. Maryland, like Delaware, provides for the close corporation by
a series of special provisions within the framework of a general corporate
law."' For the purposes of the Maryland Act, a "close corporation" is any
corporation whose charter contains the statement that it is a close corpora-
tion.'" Unless such a statement is contained in the original articles of in-
corporation, an amendment to add such a statement can be made only by
the unanimous vote of the shareholders.'"
Similarly, an amendment to the charter of a close corporation to re-
injury and any remedy with respect to such deadlock provided in the certificate of incorporation
or by-laws or any written agreement of the stockholders has failed." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1,
352(a) (1), 262(b) (1967).
17Id. 5352(b).
' Id. 353(b).
'79ld. SS 226, 275, 352, 353, 355.
'sold. § 226(b) provides that it is the duty of the custodian to "continue the businesa of the
corporation and not to liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets, except when the Court shall
order otherwise and except in cases" where the business has been abandoned or the certificate of in-
corporation authorizes dissolution. (Emphasis added.) See also id. S 226(a) (2) and the implications
of §§ 355(a)-(b).
181 I.e., either a provisional director or a custodian under id. §5 226, 352, 353.
" E.g., such as the Maryland provision but with judicial discretion as to which group of share-
holders is entitled on equitable grounds to the first option to buy. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, 5
109(c) (Supp. 1967).
a31d. §§ 100-11. For a general discussion of the close corporate provisions, see Hall, The New
Maryland Close Corporation Low, 27 Mo. L. REv. 341 (1967).
'"MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, S 100(a) (Supp. 1967).
'"Id. S 100(a) (iii).
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scind an election can be effected only by the unanimous vote of all share-
holders.'" Such a provision seems rather strange-it could permit conserva-
tive minority shareholders in effect to blackmail an expanding, thinly cap-
italized company into a forced purchase of the minority's shares in order
to secure additional financing through the issuance of new shares. How-
ever, the provision arguably may be desirable in such cases and also in
light of the Maryland requirement that no stock of a close corporation can
be transferred without unanimous shareholder consent or such transfer
restrictions in a shareholders' agreement which either grant an option of
first refusal or require the purchase of shares offered for transfer.""
Although the devolution of stock by operation of law (e.g., from a de-
ceased shareholder to the shareholder's executor or administrator) is not a
'transfer" within the meaning of the Maryland Act, any subsequent trans-
fer by the executor or administrator to a devisee of the stock under the
terms of the deceased shareholder's will is a "transfer" and requires unani-
mous approval of the surviving shareholders."' Such restrictions, of course,
are desirable insofar as they prevent the "lock-in" of minority interests
and should not be an undue burden if a properly drafted provision is in-
cluded in the shareholders' agreement. The unanimous consent provision
is similar to the partnership requirement for admission of a new partner,'
and the flexibility of change through shareholder agreement provisions also
resembles that available in general partnership law.'" However, the Mary-
land provision seems more restrictive and could create substantive law
problems for the legal representative, who may be required by the terms
under which he holds the shares to transfer them to a testamentary trus-
tee. It is unclear whether the Maryland Act would permit this second
"transfer." Presumably, a refusal to consent to such a transfer by even
one surviving shareholder would require the legal representative to petition
for involuntary dissolution which again could be in violation of the con-
ditions under which the representative holds the shares."' The only pos-
sible solution is appropriately drafted provisions in the shareholders' agree-
ment coupled with due consideration of these provisions in drafting testa-
mentary instruments for each of the shareholders. The Maryland Act
supplements the transfer restrictions by requiring unanimous shareholder
consent to the issuance of any security by the close corporation which is or
would give the holder a right to acquire its common stock.'
As does the Florida statute,' the Maryland Act specifies seven areas
which may be covered by a shareholders' agreement in addition to other
provisions relating to any aspect of the affairs of the corporation or the re-
"Id. S 100(b); Hall, supra note 183, at 353.
'7 MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, § 101 (a) (Supp. 1967); in general, see Hall, sup'ra note 183, at 348,
351-52.
"'
8 MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, 5 101 (c) (Supp. 1967), last sentence.
189E.g., TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, S 27(1), 25(2)(c)-(d), 28(B)(1)(B),
41(1), 41(3) (1961).
'"Compare the usual partnership agreement provision, such as id. § 18, with the new share-
holder's agreement provisions such as MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, § 104 (Supp. 1967).
1 MD. CoDE, ANN. art. 23, S 101(b) (Supp. 1967).
"
1
sd. S 102; Hall, sursa note 183, at 352-13.
'
"FLA. STAT. ANN. j5 608.010$(l)(a)-(g) (1963).
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lations of the stockholders inter se.'" Unlike the Delaware Code, the Mary-
land provision requires unanimous shareholder approval of the initial
shareholders' agreement or any amendment regardless of whether the agree-
ment is included in the charter, the bylaws or other written instrument.'"
The court is given specific power to enforce shareholder agreements by in-
junction or by other appropriate means.1" Caution is well advised, because
a shareholders' petition to enforce such agreements can lead to dissolution
proceedings or trigger the buy out provisions contained in the Maryland
Act."
The deadlock and dissension remedies of the Maryland Act provide
substantially more relief for the close corporation shareholder than does
the usual close corporation statute. In addition to the common corporate
statutory provision for dissolution upon deadlock,"' a shareholder may pe-
tition for dissolution upon either a refusal of the other shareholders to con-
sent to a proposed bona fide transfer or internal dissension which prevents
conducting business for the benefit of all shareholders.'"
A shareholder who wants out of the corporation gets his wish under the
Maryland Act, but possibly not in the manner he expected or desired. A pe-
tition for dissolution automatically gives the non-petitioning shareholders
an option to purchase the petitioning shareholders' stock at an agreed
price or one determined by the court in accordance with general corporate
appraisal procedure.' ° It is unclear from a reading of the statute whether a
petition for dissolution based upon an event or contingency specified in a
valid shareholders' agreement activates the option provisions."' If not pres-
ently available, such an addition would seem desirable. Also desirable would
be a provision authorizing the court in its discretion to award the purchase
option to those shareholders equitably entitled thereto. As the statute now
stands, the petitioning shareholder gets no option to purchase the stock of
the other shareholders, even though it may be their oppressive actions
which create the conditions forcing such a drastic alternative. Such a pro-
'"MD. CODE AaNt. art. 23, S5 104(a)(1)-(7) (Supp. 1967); in general, see the discussion in
Hall, supra note 183, at 354-17.
'°"Compare MD. CoDE ANN. at. 23, SS 104(a)-(b) (Supp. 1967) with DELs. CoDE ANN. tit.
8, ch. 1, 5 350 (1967).
'"MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, 5 104(d) (Supp. 1967).
"9' Id.
19 Id. S 79A.
'- Id. §5 101 (b), 109 (a); and for general discussion, see Hall, supra note 183, at 343, 361.
200 Id. SS 109(c) (Supp. 1967), 73(f) (1966). Compare with similar provisions in CONN.
GEN. STAT. COR'P. CODE S 4658 (1955), and W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 31-1-80 (1966). And see the
discussion in Hall, supra note 183, at 349, 361.
"' The language of the Code is relatively ambiguous. "Any one or more stockholders desiring to
continue the business of a close corporation may avoid the dissolution of the corporation or the
appointment of a receiver under this ection or under S 79A of this article by electing to purchase
the shares of stock owned by the petitioner at a price equal to their fair value." MD. CODE ANN.
art. 23, § 109(c) (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added). Section 79A contains relatively standard disso-
lution for deadlock provisions and requires not less than twenty-five per cent of the shares to join
in the petition unless dissolution is sought for oppressive or fraudulent acts of directors, or the
failure of the shareholders to elect directors for two consecutive annual meetings. Section 109
applies only to dissolution for internal dissension. Dissolutions required by the terms of a share-
holders' agreement are apparently not covered by such option provision and it is conceivable that
a court would so construe § 109(c). A viable corporate business could thus be dissolved by a dis-
satisfied shareholder without utilizing the desirable alternative of permitting the other shareholders
the right to continue the business if they so desire.
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vision could simply provide a subsequent option for the other sharehold-
ers if the members of the first group do not exercise their right to pur-
chase.
A superstatutory vote may be authorized for any purpose in the charter
of any corporation.' Hence, it is conceivable that such provisions, when
used in the framework of a close corporation, could give a minority inter-
est tremendous leverage with regard to the business and affairs of the cor-
poration. The majority of the shareholders may be hamstrung by the pro-
visions of their agreement, and if they petition for dissolution, they risk
purchase of their shares by the minority interests. The Maryland Act, it is
suggested, goes too far in its protection of minority interests, preferring
them to possibly valid and legitimate desires of the majority. Unanimous
consent provisions are wonderful protection devices for oppressed minority
interests, but the majority must be protected from a statutorily created
minority tyrant.
Other provisions of the Maryland Act provide for minimizing the
number of directors to one or more if a board of directors is used,' dis-
pensing with annual meetings of shareholders unless a written request for
such meeting is timely delivered to an appropriate official,' requesting a
statement of corporate affairs once annually,' and eliminating the board
of directors with direct shareholder management through appropriate pro-
visions in the close corporation's charter.' In the event the shareholders
manage the company directly, they are liable for any corporate disburse-
ment contrary to the provisions of the Act or loans made to any officer,
director, or shareholder.' I
VI. CONCLUSION
The close corporation statutes have come a long way since the North
Carolina enactment of 19 5 5. Hopefully, their development will continue.
It is suggested that the ideal accommodation of the close corporation is a
separate statute, based upon a phil9sophy of "recognition" of the partici-
pants' freedom to contract, limited only as necessary to protect creditors
and the shareholders from their own poor planning.
Such a statute is envisaged as modeled on the Uniform Partnership Act,
which was evolved to regulate the business form which most nearly re-
sembles the close corporation. The Partnership Act would, of course, re-
quire modification to provide, at minimum: (1) a definition of the close
corporation couched in terms of the degree of shareholder participation in
2MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, S 42(b) (1966).
'Id. 5 106 (Supp. 1967).
"'Id. 5104; Hall, supra note 183, at 360.
"'MD. CoDE ANN. art. 23, § 108(a) (Supp. 1967).
'Id. 5 101(a); Hall, supra note 183, at 358-59.
''MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, S 105(c) (Supp. 1967).
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management whether directly or as directors and/or officers; 55 (2) exclu-
sivity of the prescribed form for limited liability businesses falling within
the definition;' (3) registration and filing of the shareholders' agreement
and amendments which, among other provisions, would specify the mini-
mum amount of capital contributed to the business by each shareholder
and all additional contributions whether by loan or otherwise; 0 (4) limi-
tation of shareholder's personal liability to the extent of his specified capi-
tal contribution and additional sums contributed to the business; " ' (5) pro-
ceedings for the termination or acquisition of close corporate status by
corporations ceasing or commencing to meet the definitional test; (6)
full partnership treatment for failure to comply with the provisions of the
Act regarding requisite filings or transfer from close corporation to regular
corporation status or vice versa;"' and, provisions for discretionary court
action in the event of substantial shareholder dissension or deadlock. Of
course for tax purposes we would need to denominate such a statute a
"corporation" statute of some variety so as not to upset the delicately bal-
anced equities and inequities currently built into the federal income tax
structure.21
4
This concept is not new."' It has been resisted on many grounds, the
most formidable of which is probably the practitioner's own stubborn,
tenacious clinging to the traditional, the "tried and true." Although the
practitioner's magnificently devised plan may be of uncertain validity, it
has "gotten by" in the past, and, at least as important, he knows the
amount of income which can be generated by the simple incorporation
"0 The close corporation must be defined in such a way as to catch the essence of its heterog-
enous nature while at the same time furnishing the practitioner and the businessman an objective
test. A proposed cut-off point is suggested at thirty-five per cent ownership by non-participating
shareholders, i.e., true investors. United Kingdom Finance Act of 1965, Statutes Supp. 1 50, sched.
18, pt. I, §J 1-6, utilizes such a definition in conjunction with rules attributing ownership to close
relatives.
" It is desirable to insure that the regular corporate statute is not used in such a way as to op-
press minority interest. With a separate statute for the close corporation, the regular corporation
statute should be stripped of its ad hoc provisions desirable only for the close corporation. With such
provisions removed, the regular corporate statute could become an instrument of abuse if permitted
to be used for the close corporate business.
2" Notice of the arrangement inter se and the minimum amount of capital would be given
creditors and other intended parties by such filing. It is assumed that a minimum amount of capi-
talization would be established in the statute. Additional contributions to capital would require
filings to so advise creditors, if any were in fact depending upon such filing for notice. In any event,
filing provides a central source for obtaining such information when desired.
..1 The idea of requiring a businessman to risk his entire capital and family fortunes in his
business venture should have disappeared with the dark ages. Most creditors have become adequately
sophisticated to provide for their own protection. Further, the institution of insurance has become
commonplace, and in most states is required to provide funds for the more frequent and usual tort
claimants.
s2s Obviously required are the mechanical methods by which a corporation initially outside the
close corporation definition proceeds when it falls within such definition through stock purchase, or
otherwise. Similar procedures are required when the definition ceases to apply to a corporation pre-
viously filed as a close corporation.
"13 Teeth are put into the filing requirements by providing for partnership treatment in the
event of non-compliance. Such provision can, of course, be tempered as desired.
e' The taxation of the close corporation and the current delicate balance of equities and in-
equities which exist in the present federal income tax structure have been developed in J. Wolens,
Taxation and the Paper Tiger, 1968 (unpublished thesis, Harvard Law School Library).
"S E.g., Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?, 36
Fo." L. REv. 235 (1967); and partnership-like treatment was suggested in 1943, Winer,
supra note 1.
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procedures. It is suggested that the practitioner's income would not be
adversely affected by the proposed change, and once the basic format for
the "close corporation agreement" has been worked out (which can be
printed as a suggested form in the statutory material)," the practitioner
would have little trouble adapting it to fit the specific desires of his clients.
The new close corporation statutes have taken the corners off the square
hole; why not make it a perfect circle and hence, a perfect fit for our
round peg-the close corporation.
s E.g., TEX. Bus. COILP. AcT am. 3.02 (1955).
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